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Abstract. We assess theoretically the effect of forming a free trade union on the total 
production of a nation, where such effects are caused by the absorption of technologies 
through different channels. A popular metaphor describes the people as crabs in a bucket 
because when one crab tries to scape, the others pull it down avoiding a possible way out 
for all of them. Given this knowledge, posteriorly and independently of the income 
inequality levels, we extend our analyses to consider the effect of envy in a macroeconomic 
level on the total production, and draw the implications which this phenomenon has on the 
formation of free trade unions. We make strategic policy recommendations to allow the 
achievement of a globalization that benefits each member nation, where we show that the 
great trade union might have to start in certain order, with gradual and charitable 
subregional agreements, seasoned with education promotion and possibly a non restricted 
ideas employment. 
Keywords. Trade agreements, Behavioral Macroeconomics, Economic Growth, Policy 
Design. 
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1. Introduction 
he relation between international trade and economic growth has been the 
object of many theoretical and empirical works. Lal & Rajapatirana (1987) 
focus their attention on understanding the theoretical relationship between 
economic growth and trade for developing economies by testing empirical data. 
Kilic (2015) tests the effects of economic, social and political globalization on the 
growth levels of developing countries and causality relationship between the 
variables by using fixed effects least squares method and Granger causality, test for 
74 developing countries between 1981-2011 period, finding that such growth levels 
were positively affected by the economic and political globalization, whereas 
social globalization affected economic growth negatively. Moreover, his test 
results of causality put forward two way causality relationship between political 
and social globalization an the economic growth and one way causality relationship 
between social globalization and economic growth. 
Grossman & Helpman (1990) argue that the local knowledge is likely to vary 
positively with the extent of contact between domestic agents and their 
counterparts in the international research and business communities, and that the 
level of such contacts increases with the level of comertial exchange, deriving that 
this relationship depends on parameters. 
 




Journal of Economics Bibliography 
JEB, 3(3), V.H.R. Martinez, p.482-489. 
483 
Vamvakidis (1998) addresses questions that concern the relationship between 
economic integration and growth by testing the robustness of this relation, and find 
that it seems to be that a main reason for nations not to grow faster when this kind 
of agreements are done is that are closed, small, and developing economies. 
However, are these the only factors that influence this relation? If not, which 
aspects of the foreign countries should a nation look at when it comes to the search 
for forming a free trade union? Is there an ideal strategy to form these unions? 
In the present work we assess theoretically the effect of forming this kind of 
unions on the total production of a nation, considering how also the behavior or 
conduct of the nations' population matters, which allows us to get policy strategies 
to achieve the best possible globalization regime in termsof the broadly relevant 
index named economic growth. 
 
2. Free trade unions, and economic growth 
The technological level of a nation   is composed by two factors, the locally 
distinctive technology    and the standard technology    such that         . 




Therefore the total production can be represented with a function        that 
depends positively on the technological level   . We consider a production 
function that has constant marginal returns of the capital, where the capital is as 
usually treated like an homogenius good that is compounded by all the kinds of 
capital such that the nation i has the total production        . 
When there is a free trade union, the members adapt and absorb the technology 
of the other ones, which happens throughout buying capital goods, implementation, 
or other channels, and we denote the union of free trade between two nations   and 
  by    . Moreover, the total production of a union     is denoted by        
      . 
Unlike Grossman & Helpman (1990) who obtained a dependency of the change 
of knowledge capital on certain parameters, the present work takes into account 
how the interactions that take place in trade unions also derive in a sort of imitation 
or homologation process. There are two kinds of technological absorptions, the 
absorption of standard technologies and the one of locally distinctive technologies. 
The standard technology of a nation after the union     is given by     =   
       , where            and           . The locally distinctive 
technology of a union is given by           . Therefore we get that the 
technological level of a union is given by                ii 
Theorem: 
            )<              . 
 
Proof: In order to get the total production of a union                we must take 
into account the absorption of the technologies. Therefore we can just compare the 
total products as it follows 
 
                        
 
and since         and        , surprisingly we can get that               
                
This theorem means that unions are always beneficial with its members in terms 
of the total production. 
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Conjecture: The union is super additive in the sense that for   existing nations 




     
This can easily be shown by following the steps of the proof of the theorem for 
the   nations. 
If the unions are always beneficial for its members, why does it take so long for 
the world to tend to the great trade union? In the following we show some cases 
which illustrate how such benefits may not be clear for a country. 
Case 1: When    is slightly positive and           , and there is a union 
between   and   where    is meaningfully positive, we say that   is making a 
charitable agreement. Since we are dealing with macroeconomics, small variations 
on the total output are not meaningful, and it can be observed that        . 
However in this case the difference         is meaningful and so as the benefits 
from this union for the nation  . 
Case 2: When    and    are slightly positive, and           , then the union 
    will not have significative gains or benefits for any of its members. 
From these cases we get that the strategies for making unions matter, because 
the order in which a nation could form a trade agreement can result more beneficial 
to another nation if it decides to join. This is     could not be meaningfully 
beneficial for   while it is for  , and the union     could be mutually beneficial for 
  and  , with the union       being beneficial for all of its members. 
Moreover, there could be other factors that influence economic growth and the 
formation of these commercial regimes, that could explain why some nations may 
choose not to form them independently of the levels of inequality. In the following 
we explain how a behavioral factor which affects the total production could be a 
reason for avoiding the formation of some free trade unions among nations. 
 
3. Envy and economic growth (Crabs in a Bucket) 
A popular metaphor describes the people as crabs in a bucket because when one 
crab tries toscape, the others pull it down avoiding a possible way out for all of 
them. In this section we get in to the field of behavioral macroeconomics to explain 
a possible factor which is usually ignored by theories of economic growth. 
When the individuals invest to produce, other agents of the economy develop a 
feeling popularly known as envy. We represent how the agents do investments 
motivated by envy to affect negatively the income of the individuals surrounding 
them, because the increasing gains of the others make them unhappy. 
As in Solow (1956), there is an exogenous propensity to save  . The savings are 
not equal to the capital investments because we consider how part of the savings 
are utilized to destroy capital. This is      , where   is the effect of the 
propensity of spending motivated by envy and   is the effective propensity to invest 
on capital
iii
.   is exogenously given and is the static result or equilibrium of a 
behavioral dynamic as the one modeled by evolutive game theory, where the 
agents interact learning from the others and the pay back of acting with the strategy 
in question increases when these acts are more common among the population
iv
. 
This means that what builds the behavioral macroeconomics is that `unlike 
before' it takes into account the micro individual tendencies of behavior to resume 
them in overall indexes affecting the broad economic life picture. 
We use a neoclassic production function. The capital is such that the acquired 
land is also part of it, and its change equation is the following 
 
 ̇              
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The steady levels are the following 
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as we can see the effect of the propensity to spend on capital destruction 
motivated by envy   affects the steady levels. Finally, given this knowledge, notice 
that although there can be insecurity, on the data which is collected to observe how 
high is the envy for a country, this macroeconomic behaviour can always be 
accounted by looking at the amounts of these investments, and at the destroyed 
capital within an economy. 
 
4. Trade unions considering the envy of the populations 
When a free trade union is done, the individuals interact and the nations can 
foresee if the local population will learn and imitate from the other nations, or the 
other nations will end up behaving as the locals in terms of envy, in the same way 
that can foresee the technological absorption. 
The nation   knows that whether its inhabitants imitate or not the envy 
propensity of the nation   when the union     is done, depends on the size of the 
local population   , on the size of the population   , and on how influential or 
strong these envy tendencies are. 
For simplicity we take for granted that the tendencies of envy expenditures are 
equally strong or influential in every nation
v
. This is, a greater population will 
make its propensity more likely to be imitated because more persons will practice 
such propensity to spend motivated by envy, and the affected individuals will fall 
in the same behaviour. In this way, if a nation has a greater population than another 
one, its propensity will be the implemented one. Instead if both of the populations 
were equal in size, then each nation would preserve its propensity of expenditures 
motivated by envy without stability
vi
. 
We keep considering the neoclassical production function. In order to make a 
union each nation projects the effect of the union on its steady state
vii
. Therefore, 
for a nation   it will be beneficial to form a trade union with another one   if 
 
(




   
 (




   
 
 
                       
 
                          
 
    which means that if the increment on the investments is greater than the 
increment on the effect of the expenditures motivated by envy, then it will be 
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5. Policy implications 
As we saw in the previous sections, not all unions are beneficial for the nations, 
how ever, this can also be understood as how the order for making unions matters. 
This is, if a nation which has a low propensity of expenditures motivated by envy 
forms a trade union with another one with a higher propensity of this kind and a 
lower population, then the lower propensity will be imitated, and a posterior union 
with countries which have lower populations than the previous union will have the 
propensity of the previous union. But what would happen if the nation with the 
lowest propensity (it could be zero) has the lowest population? 
The sub regional agreements: A regime that looks for getting the highest 
possible benefits in the long run can look for sub regional trade unions to be done, 
where after the lowest propensity has been implemented by more people, then 
posterior unions could be formed such that all nations can tend to the globalized 
world with the lowest possible (or zero) expenditures which are motivated by envy, 
and with all the nations being benefited. Moreover, notice that if the nation with the 
lowest envy propensity has also a technological level such that its benefits from 
forming a union with any other nation are not meaningful, the great union would 
have to start with gradual an charitable subregional agreements to reach the best 
possible globalization for all the countries. 
The strategy of gradual sub regional agreements can deal with the bad effects of 
an aggresive commercial strategy that causes a contagious effect through the 
supply adjustments to, and a likely sharp down of the income, where independently 
of the employed run, promoting an increase in education would become the salt, 
pepper and saffron of the plate due to the already mentioned strength effect. In this 
way a nation can allow a population to have a new activity or behavior and other 
technological advantages. 
Another ingredient that would allow the dissemination of technologies is one 
pointed out in Pagano (2007), that the privatization of knowledge would derive in 
an overall very unequal accumulation of intelectual capital, which may also 
seriously limit the `biodiversity' of capitalism and imply a global revenge of a new 
international form of Taylorism. Further, we can always go deeper when looking at 
the products of an intensified interaction, which is thus a way to refine very 
specific policy designs. 
Remark: When a trade union is done, since the agents of all nations can invest 
anywhere and all the firms can access the same technology, we get that in 
equilibrium all the nations employ the same capital per worker. This is 
 
       
               
    
 
          and  , from which we deduce that           . Moreover, from this we 
get that inequilibrium the countries in a union will have the same per capita 
product, which has obvious implications in terms of the propensities  . 
Madsen (2009), mentions how the productivity of the countries of the OECD 
converge in an intensified manner since the end of the world war II, and basing us 
on our theoretical approach, we attribute this obvious, measured, and observed 
phenomenon, to the increasing subregional agreements between these countries. 
Durlauf (2003) argues that the right way to test convergence is by specifying to 
what club a country belongs, which is reinforced by our theory in the sense that the 
members of a convergence club happen to have integration agreements. In this way 
our theory has complemented explained visions who allow the identification of 
particular dynamics of the converging clubs
ix
, where a part from human capital 
investments, the formation of strategic unions could be the answer to scape from a 
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divergent dynamic. Moreover, recalling the empirical conjectures of Vamvakidis 
(1998), we can thus say that the small, closed, and developing economies could 
have presented an envy propensity which compensated the improvement on the 
technological levels, or made unions with countries that had similar technological 
levels and average expenditures motivated by envy. 
Fundamentally we do not extend our work to the analysis of monetary policies, 
because we consider how it is well known in the framework of economic growth, 
that any kind of change on the monetary mass does not alter the relative prices of 
the final goods because of perfect competition, which means that although an old 
shmoo becomes lower or higher than one, the produced goods of an economy are 
exactly the same, and this means that in practice the important indicators keep 
being the total production and the income distribution even for economies with 
perfect discrimination  in prices  link. 
Example: A referendum was held on Thursday 23 June, to decide whether the 
UK should leave or remain in the European Union. Leave won by 52% to 48%. 
The referendum turnout was 71.8%, with more than 30 million people voting. 
From this happening two different opinions outstand: That this change is just a 
political denomination change without consequences in terms of trade tariffs or 
openness practices, and on the other hand, that instead this happening shall change 
many daily practices directly related to the functioning of the economic life picture. 
What is sure  is that because not being part of a place with a common name 
shows probably an important correlation with social interactions and thus, tech 
nological transferences, this observed behavior gains relevance independently  of 
other unlikely observed inharmonious practiced correlations.Therefore, leaving 
safely as a common concern of standard run, the different opinions juxtaposition  
continuous expectations behavioral tendency. 
 
6. Conclusions 
We have shown how the countries are benefited by trade unions and how the 
behavior of the population is important to be considered in order to form these 
regimes. Specifically, we have analyzed the effect of macroeconomic envy on the 
total output and how if such kind of social phenomenon was true for a nation, it 
could affect the decisions to form trade unions. 
More specifically, from the described relationship we draw policy implications 
and strategies which would allow a globalization that benefits all the countries as 
much as possible, given the technology and behaviour of these regions. For 
example we showed that the great union could have to start with gradual an 
charitable subregional agreements, seasoned with education promotion and 
possibly a non restricted ideas employment, to reach the best possible globalization 
regime forall the countries. 
Finally, we can interpret that if all the nations became one union, the resulting 
region could have a higher per capita income, where the strategies and order for 
tending to this great union matter, individually of the compositions of the local 
demands and the local average labor productivities! 
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i Not necessarily all the nations have the same standard technology. 
ii For simplicity we omit the obvious specification of the equivalence relation between the cardinality 
of the finite sets of technological aspects of a country  ,    and   , and the real numbers which these 
variables also represent. 
iii Notice that the difference between consumption and investments is as clear as always. 
iv e.g. Bowles (2006), Accinelli et al. (2010), Barreira da Silva Rocha (2011), Accinelli & Sanchez 
Carrera (2012) and Sanchez Carrera (2012). 
v The education or human capital is a factor that could probably play a role in the strength level. 
vi As we have mentioned, this process is the result of the evolution of institutions. 
vii This means that the time which takes  for a new behavior to be adapted is not a concern of the 
policy makers. 
viii It results logic that   remains unchanged, because it does not depend on social interactions, but on 
the decisions of the locals. In words of Ugo Pagano: For complex organisms, natural selection can 
have an `inefficient' stabilising role and can freeze the genotypes of natural species that are not 
adapting to a changing environment (Pagano, 2011). 
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